{"id":439,"date":"2008-08-18T23:08:52","date_gmt":"2008-08-18T21:08:52","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/novysmer.cz\/index.php\/2008\/08\/18\/historie-pokusu-o-socialistickou-reformu-v-ssr\/"},"modified":"2008-08-18T23:08:52","modified_gmt":"2008-08-18T21:08:52","slug":"historie-pokusu-o-socialistickou-reformu-v-ssr","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/novysmer.cz\/index.php\/2008\/08\/18\/historie-pokusu-o-socialistickou-reformu-v-ssr\/","title":{"rendered":"Historie pokusu o socialistickou reformu v \u010cSSR"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"hano\"<\/a>Teze k 40. v\u00fdro\u010d\u00ed pokusu o socialistickou reformu v \u010cSSR v 1968 – prosinec 2007, projedn\u00e1no kolegiem volen\u00fdch funkcion\u00e1\u0159\u016f \u00daV KS\u010cM <\/p>\n

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Historie pokusu o socialistickou reformu v \u010cSSR v r. 1968 je sou\u010d\u00e1st\u00ed \u010deskoslovensk\u00e9, ale i evropsk\u00e9 historie, kterou nelze vytrhnout z celkov\u00fdch souvislost\u00ed. <\/p>\n

P\u0159i hodnocen\u00ed v\u00fdvoje v \u010ceskoslovensku je t\u0159eba br\u00e1t v \u00favahu celou \u0159adu faktor\u016f, objektivn\u00edch i subjektivn\u00edch, vnit\u0159n\u00edch i vn\u011bj\u0161\u00edch. <\/p>\n

Vn\u011bj\u0161\u00ed r\u00e1mec proces\u016f prob\u00edhaj\u00edc\u00edch v \u010ceskoslovensku byl nesporn\u011b d\u00e1n v\u00fdvojem sout\u011b\u017een\u00ed obou syst\u00e9m\u016f p\u0159edstavuj\u00edc\u00edch bipol\u00e1rn\u00ed sv\u011bt, snahou vl\u00e1dnouc\u00edch struktur kapitalistick\u00e9ho syst\u00e9mu vyu\u017e\u00edt zpomaluj\u00edc\u00ed se dynamiky v\u00fdvoje zem\u00ed prvn\u00ed historick\u00e9 formy socialismu, p\u0159edev\u0161\u00edm SSSR, postupn\u00e9ho p\u0159esunu t\u011b\u017ei\u0161t\u011b mocensk\u00e9 rovnov\u00e1hy ve prosp\u011bch z\u00e1padu. Projevovala se tu nov\u00e1 strategie, ke kter\u00e9 Z\u00e1pad dosp\u011bl po zku\u0161enostech z por\u00e1\u017eky otev\u0159en\u00fdch pokus\u016f o zm\u011bnu socialistick\u00e9 orientace v NDR, Ma\u010farsku a Polsku a po anal\u00fdze nov\u00e9 situace po XX. sjezdu KSSS vyzna\u010duj\u00edc\u00ed se akcentem m\u00edrov\u00e9ho sou\u017eit\u00ed a ur\u010dit\u00fdm ideologick\u00fdm a politick\u00fdm uvoln\u011bn\u00edm v socialistick\u00fdch zem\u00edch. Tato strategie spo\u010d\u00edvala v orientaci na pozvolnou erozi socialismu sm\u011b\u0159uj\u00edc\u00ed k odtr\u017een\u00ed jednotliv\u00fdch zem\u00ed socialistick\u00e9 soustavy, a to p\u0159ev\u00e1\u017en\u011b pomoc\u00ed ekonomick\u00e9ho sout\u011b\u017een\u00ed a ideologick\u00e9 a psychologick\u00e9 v\u00e1lky. P\u016fsobily tu i vojensko-technick\u00e9 procesy hroz\u00edc\u00ed v\u00fdvojem nov\u00fdch zbra\u0148ov\u00fdch syst\u00e9m\u016f zvr\u00e1tit dosavadn\u00ed vojensko-strategickou rovnov\u00e1hu. Tato situace p\u0159irozen\u011b zneklid\u0148ovala vl\u00e1dnouc\u00ed garnituru v SSSR, zejm\u00e9na jej\u00ed vojensk\u00e9 slo\u017eky, a zvy\u0161ovala citlivost na politick\u00e9 procesy prob\u00edhaj\u00edc\u00ed v jednotliv\u00fdch zem\u00edch sov\u011btsk\u00e9 sf\u00e9ry vytvo\u0159en\u00e9 na z\u00e1klad\u011b dohod v Jalt\u011b. <\/p>\n

Ur\u010duj\u00edc\u00edm momentem spole\u010densk\u00e9 krize v \u010ceskoslovensku v\u0161ak nebyly tyto vn\u011bj\u0161\u00ed faktory, ale p\u0159edev\u0161\u00edm nar\u016fstaj\u00edc\u00ed vnit\u0159n\u00ed krize, ve kter\u00e9 se projevoval dopad v\u00e1\u017en\u00fdch syst\u00e9mov\u00fdch vad toho modelu socialismu, kter\u00fd bylo \u010ceskoslovensko pod tlakem SSSR a v slo\u017eit\u00e9 situaci pades\u00e1t\u00fdch let nuceno p\u0159evz\u00edt. Hlavn\u00edm probl\u00e9mem byla ekonomika, jej\u00ed\u017e schopnost \u00fasp\u011b\u0161n\u00e9ho rozvoje se na p\u0159elomu 50. – 60. let vy\u010derp\u00e1vala \u00fam\u011brn\u011b k nar\u016fstaj\u00edc\u00ed pot\u0159eb\u011b p\u0159ej\u00edt od v\u00fdvoje extenzivn\u00edho k v\u00fdvoji intenzivn\u00edmu, rozvoji v\u011bdy a vyu\u017e\u00edv\u00e1n\u00ed aktivity a iniciativy lid\u00ed. Cel\u00fd syst\u00e9m \u0159\u00edzen\u00ed byl siln\u011b zat\u00ed\u017een byrokratismem, centralismem a nedemokratismem a neda\u0159ily se pokusy o jeho pozvolnou reformu. Zvl\u00e1\u0161t\u011b nep\u0159\u00edzniv\u00e1 situace v tomto smyslu vznikla na po\u010d\u00e1tku 60. let, kdy se projevily mimo jin\u00e9 i v\u00e1\u017en\u00e9 z\u00e1sobovac\u00ed obt\u00ed\u017ee. P\u0159esto v\u0161ak ekonomick\u00e1 situace v r. 1968, po p\u0159ekon\u00e1n\u00ed krachu 3. p\u011btiletky, nebyla nijak kritick\u00e1. Projevil se efekt investic do zem\u011bd\u011blstv\u00ed, pozitivn\u011b se odrazily by\u0165 i krotk\u00e9 a ned\u016fsledn\u00e9 pokusy o reformu syst\u00e9mu \u0159\u00edzen\u00ed, do podnik\u016f p\u0159ich\u00e1zely kvalifikovan\u00e9 k\u00e1dry, zlep\u0161ila se nab\u00eddka spot\u0159ebn\u00edho zbo\u017e\u00ed. T\u011b\u017ei\u0161t\u011b probl\u00e9m\u016f v\u0161ak spo\u010d\u00edvalo ve sf\u00e9\u0159e politiky a kultury, v nespokojenosti se strnul\u00fdm syst\u00e9mem \u0159\u00edzen\u00ed zakr\u00fdvaj\u00edc\u00edm probl\u00e9my, v rozporu mezi socialistick\u00fdmi ide\u00e1ly a prax\u00ed, zejm\u00e9na nedemokratickou strnulou politikou neschopnou vyu\u017e\u00edt tvo\u0159iv\u00e9 a konstruktivn\u00ed energie lid\u00ed. Tato energie p\u0159itom nar\u016fstala \u00fam\u011brn\u011b rozvoji pozitivn\u00edch str\u00e1nek socialismu, p\u0159ekon\u00e1v\u00e1n\u00ed star\u00e9ho t\u0159\u00eddn\u00edho rozd\u011blen\u00ed, zlep\u0161ov\u00e1n\u00ed soci\u00e1ln\u00ed situace spole\u010densk\u00fdch vrstev, r\u016fstu kulturnosti a vzd\u011blanosti spole\u010dnosti a tak\u00e9 formov\u00e1n\u00ed nov\u00e9 socialistick\u00e9 inteligence. Na rozd\u00edl od jin\u00fdch socialistick\u00fdch zem\u00ed se kritick\u00e1 aktivita st\u00e1le vzd\u011blan\u011bj\u0161\u00edch a sebev\u011bdom\u011bj\u0161\u00edch ob\u010dan\u016f obracela nikoli zp\u011bt ke kapitalistick\u00e9 minulosti, ale dop\u0159edu k lep\u0161\u00ed socialistick\u00e9 budoucnosti. Dobov\u00fdm obratem se st\u00e1valo v\u00edce demokracie, v\u00edce socialismu , po\u017eadavkem v\u011bt\u0161iny spole\u010dnosti bylo p\u0159ej\u00edt ke skute\u010dn\u00e9 politice vl\u00e1dy lidu, k socialistick\u00e9 demokracii, k nov\u00e9 \u00farovni spole\u010densk\u00e9 rovnosti, k pravdiv\u00e9 a \u00fapln\u00e9 informovanosti. Nejpodstatn\u011bj\u0161\u00edm momentem t\u00e9to situace bylo, \u017ee naprost\u00e1 v\u011bt\u0161ina ob\u010dan\u016f \u010cSSR neztr\u00e1cela d\u016fv\u011bru ke komunistick\u00e9 stran\u011b, nezpochyb\u0148ovala jej\u00ed \u00falohu ve spole\u010dnosti a naopak o\u010dek\u00e1vala, \u017ee strana bude st\u00e1t v \u010dele procesu n\u00e1pravy a reformy. <\/p>\n

Z tohoto hlediska byly ve spole\u010dnosti velmi pozitivn\u011b p\u0159ij\u00edm\u00e1ny informace o zm\u011bn\u00e1ch ve veden\u00ed strany, o odstran\u011bn\u00ed konzervativn\u00edho a strnul\u00e9ho veden\u00ed Anton\u00edna Novotn\u00e9ho a p\u0159\u00edchodu nov\u00fdch osobnost\u00ed, od kter\u00fdch se o\u010dek\u00e1valy pozitivn\u00ed impulsy. Pokusy utajit \u010di bagatelizovat tyto zm\u011bny neusp\u011bly a brzy se za\u010dala rozv\u00edjet \u0161irok\u00e1, do zna\u010dn\u00e9 m\u00edry ov\u0161em \u017eiveln\u00e1 aktivita raz\u00edc\u00ed nov\u00e9 my\u0161lenky a p\u0159\u00edstupy a prosazuj\u00edc\u00ed nov\u00e9 osobnosti. Hegemonem cel\u00e9ho procesu byly po\u010detn\u00e9 skupiny \u0159\u00edd\u00edc\u00edho apar\u00e1tu a inteligence, zahrnuj\u00edc\u00ed p\u0159ev\u00e1\u017en\u011b komunisty, kter\u00e9 nemohly a necht\u011bly pokra\u010dovat star\u00fdmi metodami. Z\u00e1sadn\u00edm probl\u00e9mem tohoto procesu ov\u0161em byla skute\u010dnost, \u017ee byl limitov\u00e1n dosa\u017een\u00fdm dobov\u00fdm pozn\u00e1n\u00edm, kter\u00e9 bylo do zna\u010dn\u00e9 m\u00edry ovlivn\u011bno p\u0159evzet\u00edm r\u016fzn\u00fdch problematick\u00fdch spole\u010densk\u00fdch koncepc\u00ed ze z\u00e1padn\u00edch zdroj\u016f. Chyb\u011blo hlubok\u00e9 marxistick\u00e9 pozn\u00e1n\u00ed mechanism\u016f a logiky fungov\u00e1n\u00ed cel\u00e9ho syst\u00e9mu, a p\u0159edev\u0161\u00edm chyb\u011bla spole\u010densk\u00e1 t\u0159\u00edda, kter\u00e1 by byla schopna b\u00fdt konkr\u00e9tn\u00edm nositelem proces\u016f nov\u00e9 a \u017eivotaschopn\u00e9, ale z\u00e1rove\u0148 socialistick\u00e9 a ve vztahu ke kapitalismu konkurenceschopn\u00e9 ekonomiky, v\u010detn\u011b fungov\u00e1n\u00ed nebyrokratick\u00e9ho spole\u010densk\u00e9ho vlastnictv\u00ed. Ani p\u0159edstavitel\u00e9 KS\u010c nemohli v tomto smyslu p\u0159ekro\u010dit st\u00edn doby, byli strhov\u00e1ni proudem aktivity a nedok\u00e1zali ho \u00fa\u010dinn\u011b ovliv\u0148ovat a \u0159\u00eddit. Nav\u00edc jejich situaci komplikoval tvrdo\u0161\u00edjn\u00fd odpor konzervativn\u00edch skupin ve v\u0161ech sf\u00e9r\u00e1ch \u017eivota spole\u010dnosti, p\u0159edev\u0161\u00edm ve struktur\u00e1ch strany, kter\u00e9 nem\u011bly v\u016fbec \u017e\u00e1dnou schopnost hledat cesty socialistick\u00e9 reformy, jejich\u017e jedin\u00fdm z\u00e1jmem byla obhajoba vlastn\u00edch mocensk\u00fdch pozic a c\u00edlem n\u00e1vrat zp\u011bt do centr\u00e1ln\u011b-byrokratick\u00e9ho modelu. Tyto konzervativn\u00ed s\u00edly v\u0161echny projevy kritick\u00e9 a tvo\u0159iv\u00e9 aktivity r\u016fzn\u00fdch spole\u010densk\u00fdch vrstev a priori ozna\u010dovaly jako protisocialistick\u00e9. Tyto skupiny vys\u00edlaly burcuj\u00edc\u00ed sign\u00e1ly navenek k vedouc\u00edm garnitur\u00e1m v SSSR a dal\u0161\u00edch socialistick\u00fdch zem\u00edch, kter\u00e9 jim byly sv\u00fdm politick\u00fdm a soci\u00e1ln\u00edm charakterem velmi podobn\u00e9, zvy\u0161ovaly jejich zneklidn\u011bn\u00ed z v\u00fdvoje v \u010cSSR a p\u0159isp\u00edvaly k destabilizaci situace. <\/p>\n

Nelze samoz\u0159ejm\u011b nevid\u011bt fakt, \u017ee proto\u017ee reforma pouze rozvol\u0148ovala star\u00e9 struktury a dostate\u010dn\u011b rychle nevytv\u00e1\u0159ela funguj\u00edc\u00ed a p\u0159itom socialistick\u00e9 struktury nov\u00e9, za\u010daly cel\u00e9ho procesu vyu\u017e\u00edvat i vysloven\u011b protisocialistick\u00e9 s\u00edly a s\u00edly ovliv\u0148ovan\u00e9 z\u00e1padn\u00ed ideologi\u00ed a propagandou, p\u0159\u00edpadn\u011b i p\u0159\u00edmo manipulovan\u00e9 zpravodajsk\u00fdmi strukturami a mechanismy. Tyto s\u00edly vyu\u017e\u00edvaly \u017eivelnosti cel\u00e9ho procesu a nedostatku stabiliza\u010dn\u00edch mechanism\u016f, doh\u00e1n\u011bly do krajnosti po\u017eadavky na zm\u011bny a reformy a p\u0159ekra\u010dovaly p\u0159itom st\u00e1le v\u00edce socialistick\u00fd r\u00e1mec jak v ekonomice, tak v politice i duchovn\u00ed sf\u00e9\u0159e. V praktick\u00e9 rovin\u011b byly v dan\u00e9 vnit\u0159n\u00ed, ale zejm\u00e9na mezin\u00e1rodn\u00ed situaci nejnebezpe\u010dn\u011bj\u0161\u00ed po\u017eadavky sm\u011b\u0159uj\u00edc\u00ed k odstran\u011bn\u00ed vedouc\u00ed \u00falohy strany, zpochyb\u0148ov\u00e1n\u00ed spole\u010densk\u00e9ho vlastnictv\u00ed, z\u00e1kladn\u00edch ideov\u00fdch hodnot spojen\u00fdch s marxismem, a zejm\u00e9na po\u017eadavky zm\u011bny zahrani\u010dn\u011bpolitick\u00e9 orientace, zpo\u010d\u00e1tku ve form\u011b neutrality. Tyto s\u00edly zneu\u017e\u00edvaly existuj\u00edc\u00ed plurality a nepou\u010denosti a nezku\u0161enosti \u0159ady ob\u010dan\u016f a jejich ur\u010dit\u00e9ho opojen\u00ed ze svobody, pronikaly do sd\u011blovac\u00edch prost\u0159edk\u016f, rozn\u011bcovaly emoce do podoby n\u00e1tlaku na reformn\u00ed veden\u00ed strany, ale i do podoby skandalizov\u00e1n\u00ed a pron\u00e1sledov\u00e1n\u00ed \u0159ady \u010destn\u00fdch komunist\u016f a vyvol\u00e1v\u00e1n\u00ed r\u016fzn\u00fdch exces\u016f. Nastolov\u00e1n\u00edm sporn\u00fdch t\u00e9mat, zejm\u00e9na v oblasti zahrani\u010dn\u011bpolitick\u00e9 orientace, provokovaly konzervativn\u00ed s\u00edly i veden\u00ed SSSR a socialistick\u00fdch zem\u00ed a pom\u00e1haly rozt\u00e1\u010det nekone\u010dnou spir\u00e1lu vz\u00e1jemn\u00e9ho provokov\u00e1n\u00ed extr\u00e9mn\u00edch vnit\u0159n\u00edch projev\u016f na jedn\u00e9 stran\u011b a zahrani\u010dn\u00edho umrav\u0148ov\u00e1n\u00ed na druh\u00e9 stran\u011b vyvol\u00e1vaj\u00edc\u00edho jen zase dal\u0161\u00ed extr\u00e9mn\u00ed projevy. Reformn\u00ed stranick\u00e1 garnitura v \u010dele s Alexandrem Dub\u010dekem se tak dost\u00e1vala do bezv\u00fdchodn\u00e9ho postaven\u00ed a p\u0159est\u00e1vala situaci zvl\u00e1dat. <\/p>\n

S\u00edlu p\u016fsoben\u00ed skute\u010dn\u011b protisocialistick\u00fdch a pravicov\u00fdch sil v\u0161ak nelze p\u0159ece\u0148ovat, proto\u017ee jejich p\u016fsoben\u00ed nebylo pro cel\u00fd v\u00fdvoj podstatn\u00e9 a nem\u011bly za sebou v\u00fdznamn\u011bj\u0161\u00ed soci\u00e1ln\u00ed subjekty. Nav\u00edc existovala re\u00e1ln\u00e1 mo\u017enost, \u017ee proveden\u00edm z\u00e1sadn\u00edch k\u00e1drov\u00fdch zm\u011bn na p\u0159ipravovan\u00e9m XIV. sjezdu dojde ke stabilizaci a paralyzov\u00e1n\u00ed prav\u00e9ho extr\u00e9mu. Podstatn\u00fdm faktorem byly vl\u00e1dnouc\u00ed skupiny v socialistick\u00fdch zem\u00edch, p\u0159edev\u0161\u00edm v sov\u011btsk\u00e9m veden\u00ed, kter\u00e9 se jednak ob\u00e1valy p\u0159enesen\u00ed proces\u016f nebezpe\u010dn\u00fdch pro jejich monopol do vlastn\u00edch zem\u00ed, jednak sledovaly s obavami v\u00fdvoj vojensko-strategick\u00e9 rovnov\u00e1hy ve sv\u011bt\u011b a cht\u011bly vyu\u017e\u00edt situace k pos\u00edlen\u00ed sv\u00e9 velmocensk\u00e9 pozice. Pr\u00e1v\u011b v t\u011bchto kruz\u00edch, za ur\u010dit\u00e9 sou\u010dinnosti dom\u00e1c\u00edch konzervativn\u00edch skupinek, se nakonec zrodilo rozhodnut\u00ed ukon\u010dit nebezpe\u010dn\u00fd a rizikov\u00fd proces. Vzhledem k tomu, \u017ee se jim nepoda\u0159ilo ovlivnit hlavn\u00ed reformn\u00ed proud ve veden\u00ed strany a z\u00edskat ho k tomu, aby proces ukon\u010dil s\u00e1m a vr\u00e1til se do star\u00e9ho modelu, do\u0161lo 21. 8. k proveden\u00ed n\u00e1siln\u00e9 vojensk\u00e9 intervence 5 zem\u00ed Var\u0161avsk\u00e9 smlouvy. USA a mocnosti NATO, pro kter\u00e9 byl spole\u010densk\u00fd proces v \u010cSR ostatn\u011b rovn\u011b\u017e p\u0159\u00edli\u0161 nebezpe\u010dn\u00fd (viz ud\u00e1losti ve Francii) a kter\u00e9 kalkulovaly s vnit\u0159n\u00ed diskreditac\u00ed socialismu a mezin\u00e1rodn\u00ed diskreditaci socialistick\u00e9ho t\u00e1bora a komunistick\u00e9ho hnut\u00ed, ho p\u0159ijaly s tich\u00fdm souhlasem. <\/p>\n

Dal\u0161\u00ed v\u00fdvoj ve sv\u011bt\u011b i v \u010cSSR uk\u00e1zal, \u017ee zvolen\u00e9 n\u00e1siln\u00e9 a nedemokratick\u00e9 ukon\u010den\u00ed reformn\u00edho procesu v \u010cSSR m\u011blo nedoz\u00edrn\u00fd negativn\u00ed dopad. Tento krok doslova \u0161okoval v\u011bt\u0161inu ob\u010dan\u016f \u010cR, v\u010detn\u011b mnoha tehdej\u0161\u00edch \u010dlen\u016f KS\u010c a hluboce naru\u0161il tradi\u010dn\u00ed dobr\u00e9 \u010deskoslovensko-sov\u011btsk\u00e9 vztahy. Zablokoval perspektivu dal\u0161\u00edho postupu k funk\u010dn\u011bj\u0161\u00ed a \u017eivotaschopn\u011bj\u0161\u00ed, soci\u00e1ln\u011b spravedliv\u011bj\u0161\u00ed, demokrati\u010dt\u011bj\u0161\u00ed socialistick\u00e9 spole\u010dnosti. P\u0159isp\u011bl ke ztr\u00e1t\u011b d\u016fv\u011bry v komunistickou stranu a spolu s prov\u011brkami v obdob\u00ed tzv. normalizace postavil proti KS\u010c i mnoh\u00e9 jej\u00ed \u010dleny, kte\u0159\u00ed se jinak zejm\u00e9na s jej\u00edm soci\u00e1ln\u00edm programem ztoto\u017e\u0148ovali (\u0159ada z nich vstoupila do komunistick\u00e9 strany znovu po roce 1989). P\u0159es do\u010dasn\u00e9 udr\u017een\u00ed pom\u011bru sil a rovnov\u00e1hy v mezin\u00e1rodn\u00edm m\u011b\u0159\u00edtku srpnov\u00fd vstup vojsk \u010deskoslovensk\u00e1 spole\u010dnost nep\u0159ijala a jako celek se s n\u00edm neztoto\u017enila. St\u00edn mocensk\u00e9ho z\u00e1sahu pak hluboce ovlivnil mo\u017enosti rozvoje socialismu u n\u00e1s a negativn\u011b ovlivnil i postaven\u00ed levice v cel\u00e9 Evrop\u011b. <\/p>\n

Na\u0161e Pravda, p\u0159\u00edloha Hal\u00f3 Noviny, 18. srpna 2008, redak\u010dn\u00ed zpr\u00e1va<\/em> <\/p>\n

\u00a0 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Teze k 40. v\u00fdro\u010d\u00ed pokusu o socialistickou reformu v \u010cSSR v 1968 – prosinec 2007, projedn\u00e1no kolegiem volen\u00fdch funkcion\u00e1\u0159\u016f \u00daV<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":63,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_active":false,"_exactmetrics_sitenote_note":"","_exactmetrics_sitenote_category":0},"categories":[8],"tags":[36],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/novysmer.cz\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/439"}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/novysmer.cz\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/novysmer.cz\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/novysmer.cz\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/novysmer.cz\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=439"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"http:\/\/novysmer.cz\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/439\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/novysmer.cz\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/63"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/novysmer.cz\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=439"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/novysmer.cz\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=439"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/novysmer.cz\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=439"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}